The purpose of this paper is to study the implications of currency denomination mismatch in the balance sheets of banks on the relationship between currency risk and sovereign default risk. This issue is a key ingredient in the discussion of the pros and cons of dollarizing economies in which the monetary authority lacks credibility.
Most of the arguments in favor of dollarization depend on the alleged high relationship between devaluation risk and default risk. In fact, if a mayor determinant of default risk is the risk of devaluation, then, by taking away the technology to devalue from the domestic Central Bank, dollarization can substantially reduce the default risk with all the implied advantages that a reduction on the cost of capital conveys. Thus, one may argue, this relationship between devaluation risk and default risk is at the heart of the debate.
The obvious question to raise at this time is how are we to think conceptually about this relationship between devaluation risk and default risk. One of the main, although not the only one, proposed channels for this relationship is the existence of explicit or implicit bail outs that the Central Bank is forced to do to avoid generalized bankruptcies in the banking system. Thus, the argument may go, if the banks have a share of assets in domestic currency that is larger than the share of liabilities, a devaluation may bankrupt otherwise solvent banks. The …scal needs generated by this bail-out may force a default on government bonds.
The purpose of this paper is to take this story seriously and study its implications in terms of interpreting the equilibrium interest rates on the di¤erent bonds issued by governments that lack credibility. If the story is correct, interest rate data should reveal a high correlation between expected default on sovereign bonds and expected devaluations. This is an important issue, since we would like to have a tractable conceptual framework with which to analyze the available evidence.
In order to interpret the data, we start by considering the di¤erent ways governments have to change the value of their existing liabilities, namely, to default on domestic currency bonds, to default on foreign currency bonds, and to devalue. As these variables are unobservable we need to use economic theory to uncover them.
A common approach to this problem, which is our departure point, is to look at the correlation between i t ¡ i ¤ t and i ¤ t ¡ r t ; where i t is the interest rate on domestic currency sovereign bonds, i ¤ t is the interest rate on foreign currency sovereign bonds, and r t is the risk-free rate on foreign currency bonds. This correlation is interpreted as the correlation between default risk and devaluation risk. The problem with this approach is that the two arbitrage relations among these bonds are not enough to identify the correlations between the three variables of interest. We illustrate how di¤erent assumptions regarding the behavior of the government imply very di¤erent interpretations of the data.
We propose to solve this identi…cation problem by studying a simple dynamic Ramsey problem in which the government is allowed to default on its debt and devalue at the start time of its plan, but must guarantee a minimum level of pro…ts to banks. The analysis shows how existing balance sheets determine the government's optimal choices. Balance sheet structures a¤ect the choice of the government between the alternative default instruments. Our simple model solves the identi…cation problem mentioned above.
Several caveats are in order. First, our model does not take the story mentioned above literally, in which given a devaluation, a bail-out and a default on bonds, that otherwise would not happen, follow. In the model we assume, as we believe is sensible, that the government chooses jointly to devalue, to bail-out and to default on bonds. Second, to model default in equilibrium is a tricky business. We take a simple approach. Since we are interested in studying how governments optimally behave when, with small probability and by some reason we do not explain, they opt for breaking promises, we use a model in which a government can default only once. The simplest way to do this is to solve a Ramsey problem, assume commitment, and let the government do the -…rst and -last break in its promises. This model provides a theory on how governments behave when they can default only once, which, hopefully, has implications similar to the ones of a model in which governments do default in equilibrium with small probability, a theory we cannot write.
1 The Identi…cation Problem without an Optimizing Government.
The standard approach to look at the correlation between sovereign default risk and devaluation risk rests on the arbitrage restrictions,
where ± ¤ and ± are the repudiation rates of dollar and peso denominated sovereign debt and ² is the devaluation rate. For simplicity, we assume that agents are risk-neutral.
The identi…cation problem arises because these two equations and the interest rate data are insu¢cient to uncover the unobserved variables of interest. Substituting for 1 ¡ ± ¤ t+1 we obtain (1 + i t ) E ³ 1¡±t+1 1+"t+1´= 1 + r t : an equation with two unknowns. It is clear that there is a missing equation.
The consequences of this identi…cation problem are serious. Di¤erent assumptions about the missing equation imply radically di¤erent interpretations of the data. To see this, using the approximation
and ignoring products of small numbers, re-write these equations as
The covariance between i t ¡ i
¢¤
Alternative assumptions on the government's default policy have very different implications for the interpretation of the data.
Consider …rst the case in which the government always defaults on domestic and foreign currency debt simultaneously: ± t = ± ¤ t for all t. Under this assumption,
so the covariance between the currency spread and the sovereign spread reveals the covariance between the devaluation risk and the default risk on foreign currency sovereign bonds. Alternatively, consider the case in which the government never defaults on domestic currency sovereign debt explicitly, but it does so implicitly by devaluing. In this case, ± t = 0 for all t,
The usual measure of the correlation between default and devaluation risk is
In the …rst case, cov (i t ¡ i ¤ t ; i ¤ t ¡ r t ) = 0 implies that the case for dollarization is weak because in the data there is no relation between currency and sovereign default risk on foreign currency debt. In the second case, the same ovservation implies that cov ¡ E" t+1 ; E±
¢ > 0; so the case for dollarization is consistent with the data.
The next section addresses this identi…cation problem by studying a simple dynamic Ramsey problem for a government that chooses devaluation rates, default rates, and guarantees a minimum pro…t to banks. The theory will tell us when is the government going to default on its domestic currency debt explicitly through repudiation or implicitly through devaluation.
2 Sovereign Default and Devaluation in a Ramsey Problem with Bank Bailouts.
We study the decision problem faced by the government of a small open economy that, at time t = 0, must …nance a given stream of government expenditures choosing a sequences of income tax rates, exchange rates and default rates on debts it inherits from the past. We assume that there is a …xed exchange rate regime in which government commits to exchange any amount of domestic and foreign currency at pre-announced exchange rates. A second key assumption of our model is that the government guarantees a minimum level of pro…ts to the banking system. It is assumed throughout the exercise that this government can perfectly commit to future policies.
Economic environment and de…nition of equilibrium.
There is no uncertainty and agents have perfect foresight.
There are two goods produced with the linear technology,
where y it ; n it denote output and labor for goods i = 1; 2: Good 1 is not traded internationally and good 2 is. Purchasing power parity holds for the traded good Firms choose labor inputs to maximize
subject to n 1t ; n 2t¸0 : e t ; w t ; p 1t are the domestic currency prices of foreign currency, labor, the non-traded good. p ¤ 2t is the foreign currency price of the traded good. This problem has an interior solution only if
Other possibilities will not be considered Household preferences over these two goods and work e¤ort, n t ; are described by the utility function
where 0 <¯< 1; ® > 0; u : R ! R is monotonically increasing, concave, and satis…es lim x!0 u 0 (x) = 1 and lim x!1 u (x) = 0: Purchases of the non-tradable good c 1t have to be paid with domestic cash, while those of c 2t can be paid with credit. The cash in advance constraint for good 1 is
Household's budget constraints are given by
for t = 0; 1; 2; :::where B Implicit in these budget constraints is the assumption that there are no arbitrage opportunities: 1 + i t = (1 + i ¤ t ) e t+1 =e t for all t¸0 . Note also that, as we assume the government can commit, we can ignore future default rates 2 . Thus, we impose ± t = ± ¤ t = 0 for t > 0 without loss of generality. In addition to the ‡ow budget constraint above, households are restricted by the no Ponzi game condition
Financial intermediaries costlessly receive deposits and lend money to the government and to the private sector. End of period balance sheets are described by
t for t = ¡1; 0; 1; : : :
No arbitrage implies that the return on bonds and other assets is the same. If i b t is the interest rate on bonds, no arbitrage implies
and bank pro…ts are
¢ + T t for t = 1; 2; : : :
T t is a transfer scheme that guarantees banks a minimum level of pro…ts. In our case this level of pro…ts is zero, but we can easily accommodate any constant. The transfer scheme is
A government insurance protects the banking system from aggregate shocks such as devaluations and sovereign defaults. The rule is meant to capture in a simple way the contingent debt nature of banks negative pro…ts for the government.
Perfect foresight and no arbitrage conditions imply that bank pro…ts and bailouts are zero for all t¸1: Bank bailouts at t = 0 are
Observe that defaults on government bonds may cause transfers to banks. Also, liability dollarization in the banking system makes the transfers that occur when banks have negative pro…ts an increasing function of the exchange rate.
The government has to service its debt and pay for transfers to banks and households by levying income taxes, issuing money and by choosing repudiation rates on its liabilities. Let B g¤ t ; B g t be government bond holdings. Government's budget constraints are
¢ B g¤ t¡1 + ¿ t ! t n t ¡ p 1t g for t = 1; 2; : : :
and the no Ponzi game condition
For simplicity, assume the foreign government follows the Friedman rule for monetary policy-i.e. i ¤ t = 0 for t = ¡1; 0; 1; : : : p ¤ 2t =¯t for t = 0; 1; : : : for t = 0; 1; 2; ::::.To normalize, we also assume that e ¡1 = 1; i ¡1 = 0:
A consequence of this assumption is that an equilibrium exists only if exchange rates satisfy e t+1¸et for all t:
Otherwise, interest on domestic bonds will be negative, creating an arbitrage opportunity. Combining household's and government's ‡ow budget constraints, the no Ponzi game condition, expressions for bank pro…ts, and the Friedman rule assumption for foreign monetary policy, we obtain
for households, and
Adding the government's and the household's budget constraint we obtain the country's budget constraint,
Market clearing for the non-internationally-traded good, labor and bonds requires n 1t = c 1t for all t (7a) n 1t + n 2t = n t for all t (7b)
We assume that all domestic currency bonds are held domestically. Thus, when markets clear the government budget constraint becomes
This equation states that the present value of the country's trade de…cits equal the country's initial non-defaulted net foreign assets. Denote initial portfolios as
For given initial portfolios I 0 , an allocation fc 1t ; c 2t ; n 1t ; n 2t ; M t g 1 t=0 is a competitive equilibrium with bank bailouts, taxes and default if, and only if, (i) consumers maximize utility (2) subject to budget (5) and cash-in-advance (3) constraints,
(ii) government policies f± 0 ; ± ¤ 0 g and fg; ; ¿ t ; e t g 1 t=0 are consistent with the government's budget constraint (??) and the non-negativity of domestic currency interest rates (4), (iii) …rms solve (1), (iv) the market clearing conditions (7) are satis…ed.
Household's problem. The …rst order conditions of the household's problem for t = 0; 1; 2; ::::::: are
The household's optimality conditions, the non-negativity of interest rates (4), and the budget constraint (5) yield the implementability conditions
Using the implementability condition we obtain a simpler de…nition of equilibrium. For initial portfolios I 0 given; an allocation fc 1t ; c 2t ; n 1t ; n 2t g 1 t=0 is a competitive equilibrium with bank bailouts, taxes and default if, and only if, it satis…es the conditions (6), (7) and (11).
Solution of The Ramsey Problem
Governments problem is to choose fe 0 ; ± 0 ; ± ¤ 0 g and fc 1t ; c 2t ; n 1t ; n 2t ; M t g 1 t=0 in order to maximize (2) subject to conditions (6), (7) and (11), with initial portfolios I 0 given. Conditions (6), (7) and (11) insure that the chosen allocation is a competitive equilibrium. The taxes and exchange rates that implement each allocation are given by (9).
We will focus on the case where all bonds at t = ¡1 are issued by the government and all private agents have initial positive bond holdings-i.e. Note that consumption of the credit good must be constant over time, so the government can only choose the level of the tax, but must keep it constant 3 . On the other hand, the government can choose di¤erent values for consumption of the cash good over time by changing the devaluation rate constrained to satisfy the non-negativity of nominal interest rates. Finally, the government also chooses the initial nominal exchange rates and default rates. Government chooses fc 1t ; n 1t ; n 2t g 1 t=0 and fc 2; e 0 ; ± 0 ; ± ¤ 0 g to maximize the Lagrangean
We ignore the non-negativity constraints on nominal interest rates and later verify that they will be satis…ed.
First, we discuss the necessary conditions for an interior optimum with respect to consumption and labor. To simplify the discussion and focus on the optimal choices of default rates and devaluation rates, consider the case in which U(c) = c 1¡¾ =(1 ¡ ¾): These …rst order conditions can be combined to yield
and
First, note that (12) implies that the optimal nominal interest rate is constant over time, so in the solution c 1t = c 1 for all t: Also, combining (12) and (13) we obtain
Note also that the multiplier¸is positive, since it measures the marginal cost of increasing the transfers g: Thus, U 0 (c 2 ) < U 0 (c 1 ); which means that
: Thus, the optimal policy is characterized by a positive and constant devaluation rate 4 . These results are standard in the literature on dynamic Ramsey problems.
We now focus on the optimal choice of devaluation and default rates at time zero in en economy with bank bailouts. Using bank's balance sheets at t = ¡1; and assuming i ¡1 = i ¤ ¡1 = 0; e ¡1 = 1; bank bailouts can be written as
Changes in exchange rates and default on bonds held by banks may trigger bailouts. The relation between bailouts and exchange rates depends on the currency exposure of banks, as shown by the expression
The size of bank bailouts is an increasing function of devaluations when banks have positive net assets denominated in domestic currency. If banks have net liabilities in domestic currency devaluations contribute to ex-post bank pro…ts and reduce the size of bailouts. If there is no default on domestic currency bonds, bank's domestic currency exposure is equal to
Bailouts are an increasing function of the exchange rate when there is liability dollarization-D
When there is a currency mismatch in banks portfolios, we will say that there is liability dollarization when (1
Depending on whether there is liability dollarization or not, bail outs are positive or negative depending on whether e 0 ? ¹ e 0 :
where
It will be useful to have expressions for private assets with and without bailouts. If there is no bailout private assets are
while in the case where there is a bailout they are
: Consider now the …st order conditions of the Ramsey problem with respect to
with bailout
Thus, under the assumption B H¤ ¡1 ; B B¤ ¡1 > 0 in either case the derivative is negative. As, we also assume that initially the country is a net debtor (i.e., B F ¤ ¡1 > 0 ) the left-hand-side of (14) is positive and, since the multipliers ought to be nonnegative, then ¹ ¤ 1 > ¹ ¤ 0 = 0; which means that ± ¤ 0 = 1 is optimal. The intuition is very simple. Even though it is true that by defaulting on foreign currency denominated bonds the government can increase the contingent liabilities since banks can be holding some of those bonds, the net e¤ect is positive, to the extent that households and foreigners hold positive amounts of foreign currency denominated debt. Now, let us focus on the joint choices of e 0 and ± 0 : Note that the derivative of the Lagrangean with respect to ± 0 is given by
e 0 with no bailout
e 0 with bailout.
Under our assumptions on initial portfolios, as long as e 0 is bounded in both cases ¹ 1 > ¹ 0 = 0 and it is optimal to set ± 0 = 1: Note, however, that in the case in which e 0 is arbitrarily large, the value of ± 0 is inessential. As there is no bene…t from defaulting we will assume that government chooses ± 0 = 0 when e 0 is arbitrarily large. The …rst order condition with respect to e 0 is
¢¤ with no bailout
The optimal choice of the initial exchange rate depends crucially on the interaction between private balance sheet positions and bailouts.
If
bailouts are a decreasing function of the exchange rate and become zero for e 0 > ¹ e 0 : In this case, for a large enough exchange rate there is no bailout because banks are net debtors in domestic currency and for a large enough e 0 ex-post bank pro…ts will be non-negative.
¢ > 0 it is optimal to set e 0 as large as possible. The devaluation removes the incentives to set ± 0 = 1 since it makes the real value of the domestic currency government debt equal to zero. ± 0 = 0:
If there is liability dollarization in the banking system. (1 ¡ ± 0 ) B reducing bailouts exceeds the cost that arises from the increase in the real value of non-defaulted nominal government liabilities, M ¡1 : The value of ¹ e 0 when ± 0 = ± ¤ 0 = 1 is lower than one. ¹ e 0 < 1: The following table summarizes all the possible cases for the optimal choice of e 0 ; ± 0 ; and ± ¤ 0 :
These conditions imply the following optimal choice of e 0 ; ± 0 ; and ± ¤ 0 for each initial balance sheets structure.
When there is no liability dollarization if the government is to renege on prior commitments at time t = 0; it is optimal for it to default on foreign currency denominated debt and implement a large devaluation. Defaulting on foreign currency denominated debt and devaluing will also be the optimal choice if there is liability dollarization, but M ¡1 + B H ¡1 > L ¡1 ¡ D ¡1 : Finally, the government will revalue if there is liability dollarization and M ¡1 < L ¡1 ¡ D ¡1 :
Concluding Remarks
A key issue in the discussion of the bene…ts of dollarization is the hypothesis that in economies where there is liability dollarization in the banking sector a devaluation will cause a default on sovereign debt. If this alleged causal relationship actually exists removing the technology to devalue will reduce sovereign risk will all the bene…ts that this entails.
Testing whether this positive correlation between default risk and devaluation risk exists in the data is crucial when evaluating the bene…ts of dollarizing an economy. Uncovering this correlation in the data is di¢cult because expected defaults and expected devaluations are unobserved variables.
We propose a simple dynamic model of a small open economy with …xed exchange rates where the government bails out banks with negative pro…ts and chooses devaluation and default rates on domestic and foreign currency to interpret the data.
The model implies that if
it will be optimal for the government to default on its foreign currency debt, set ± ¤ 0 = 1; and to devalue. As the devaluation takes care of the default on the domestic currency debt, government never defaults on domestic currency debt setting ± 0 = 0: This con…guration of balance sheets thus implies that expected devaluation rates and expect default on foreign currency debt are
In the remaining case, where balance sheets satisfy the conditions B B ¡1 + L ¡1 > D ¡1 and M ¡1 < L ¡1 ¡ D ¡1 ; it is optimal for the government to revalue to reduce bank bailouts and default on domestic and foreign currency debt. In this case ± 0 = ± ¤ 0 : This con…guration of balance sheets implies that expected devaluation rates and expect default on foreign currency debt are
